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RECOGNITION OF GROUP RIGHTS  
AS REQUISITE TO SUBSTANTIVE  
EQUALITY GOALS 
Kathrina Szymborski* †
Courts, legislatures, and scholars are increasingly turning away from 
traditional Aristotelian thinking in favor of a substantive, pro-active ap-
proach to equality. Under the substantive approach, the identification and 
eradication of systematic discrimination replace an adherence to neutral 
principles. This Comment argues that while a substantive approach is the 
most effective way to bring about true equality, it will not succeed unless it 
centers on protecting group rights. State decision-makers and international 
human rights advocates must focus on group experiences in order to create 
societies where no one is favored based on immutable characteristics.  
I. Aristotelian Thinking Frustrates True Equality 
Aristotle wrote that “[e]quality consists in the same treatment of similar 
persons.” This thinking still dominates equality law. For example, France 
refuses to recognize minorities, instead choosing to pretend that everyone is 
the same.  In doing so, France avoids Aristotelian pitfalls that justify inferior 
treatment for those who are different. When the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee recently reviewed France, a member of the French Dele-
gation explained, “The French people are one.” Thus, France collects no 
information or statistics about ethnic origins or religion, and insists that the 
individual rights in the Constitution adequately protect all citizens.  
Though France avoids the Aristotelian tendency to justify second-rate 
treatment for some, its insistence that all members of a society are the 
same—and therefore deserving of similar treatment—fits squarely into Aris-
totelian thinking. This approach is problematic because it elevates abstract 
principles over human experience. Without considering data that illuminate 
the realities of social injustice (i.e., who is poor, who is unrepresented, who 
does what to whom), policymakers cannot identify nor respond to the needs 
of those who suffer from systematic discrimination. Human Rights Commit-
tee member Nigel Rodley pointed out during the review of France that 
inequality is “perfectly capable of passing as formal equality.” It is easy to 
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Of course, the determination that all members of a group are treated 
equally is important in the substantive approach, but for different reasons 
than Aristotelian thinking. The determination shows that the treatment is a 
result of membership in the group, rather than based on individual character-
istics or merits. While the Aristotelian framework uses groups to determine 
whether certain treatment of individuals qualifies as equality, a substantive 
group-based approach uses categorization to determine whether inferior 
treatment is a result of group membership, or a consequence of an individ-
ual’s own merits. Under such an analysis, as Canadian Supreme Court 
look at a society and declare that everybody must be equal because the same 
laws apply to everybody in the same manner. In reality, when the same law 
applies both to someone suffering from discrimination and to a privileged 
individual, the outcome preserves the status quo—an unfortunate result, as 
the status quo is usually unequal and discriminatory. 
A policymaker working within an Aristotelian framework may be under-
standably wary of recognizing differences. While insisting that all are the 
same has resulted in the maintenance of the status quo, the recognition of 
difference has led to some of the worst injustices in history. Consider, for 
example, Nazi Germany’s justification of its treatment of Jews based on 
their difference from “Aryans.” This is equality under Aristotelian thinking, 
provided all Jews are treated the same as other Jews, and all “Aryans” are 
treated the same as other “Aryans.” Compare this with the French model, 
under which all French people are treated similarly simply because they are 
French. On a very basic level, the idea is the same in both societies: within 
each group, everyone receives similar treatment.  
Thus, group identification is nothing new in equality law. An effective 
substantive approach would similarly require categorization to determine 
proper treatment, but with one big difference: under the Aristotelian frame-
work, differing treatment of different groups is equality; while under a 
substantive approach, differing treatment is a means to equality. Substantive 
equality focuses on a law’s effects on individuals and groups.  
II. Shifting Away From Aristotle’s Perception of Groups 
The substantive approach recognizes that equality is a comparative con-
cept. To Aristotle, equality is achieved when everyone within an identifiable 
group is treated similarly. Under a group-based substantive approach, 
meanwhile, this determination is meaningless without comparing the treat-
ment of the group to that of other groups. In Bliss v. Canada, for example, 
the Canadian Supreme Court used Aristotelian thinking to uphold a law that 
discriminated against pregnant women by reasoning that “the class into 
which [plaintiff] fell . . . was that of pregnant persons, and within that class, 
all persons were treated equally.” Had the Canadian Supreme Court used a 
substantive framework, it would have taken the analysis further, considering 
whether the law treated pregnant persons differently from non-pregnant per-
sons, and if so, whether the treatment was inferior, thereby warranting 
rectification.  
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Accordingly, the most useful definitions of discrimination incorporate 
group experiences. Compare, for example, the definition of discrimination 
articulated in Andrews, Canada’s landmark equality case, to that adopted by 
the United Nations in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Justice McIntyre pointed out in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, 
“[d]istinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual 
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge 
of discrimination, while those based on an individual’s merits and capacities 
will rarely be so classed.” Comparing two individuals who have been treated 
differently does not tell us why they have experienced the respective treat-
ments. Unless we find that inferior treatment is the norm across an entire 
group, we cannot call the treatment discrimination. Thus, the same categori-
zation guidelines that signify equality under Aristotelian reasoning can, 
under a substantive approach, highlight groups to be targeted by equality 
legislation.  
III. Human Rights Advocates and Policymakers  
Must Embrace Group Rights 
Human rights scholars and Western policymakers have traditionally 
shied away from recognizing group rights. Instead, many prefer to concen-
trate on rights guaranteed to individuals. Group rights are a relatively new 
and controversial concept. In human rights discourse, the term is most com-
monly associated with the ever-contentious right to self-determination. 
Unease about group rights comes from many sources. As any student of 
human rights can attest, universality is the central, defining characteristic of 
human rights. Group rights, however, lack universality, as they do not attach 
to all people as a fundamental aspect of humanity, but only attach to mem-
bers of specific groups. Those sensitive to Aristotelian thinking dislike the 
tendency of social groups to emphasize differences among human beings, 
and prefer individual rights for the value they bestow on characteristics 
shared by all people—namely, individuality and common humanity. Mean-
while, the term “group rights” has an unpleasant ring in the fiercely 
individualist West, where the term conjures images of socialism and state 
encroachment on political freedom.  
Catharine MacKinnon, a vocal advocate of substantive equality, has de-
scribed the weaknesses of these attitudes and how they hinder the realization 
of equality. In her book, Sex Equality, she writes that “[g]roup membership 
does not simply distinguish humans; it is part of being human.” This being 
the case, law should not divide “human status (group-based) from human 
treatment (individual) . . . as if those with unequal social status will still be 
treated equally.” In short, refusing to recognize and protect group rights is 
inconsistent with the realistic pursuit of equal treatment for all individuals.  
IV. The Definition of Discrimination Should Make  
Specific Reference to Groups  
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Deciding which groups deserve collective rights has important ramifica-
tions for oppressed segments of the population. The Andrews Court 
indicated that “disadvantaged groups” qualify for special legal protection. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in the famous Carolene Products footnote, pointed 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”). The Canadian Supreme Court 
in Andrews described discrimination as “a distinction, whether intentional or 
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individ-
ual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or 
disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or 
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society” (emphases added). CEDAW, on the 
other hand, refers to discrimination against women as “any distinction, ex-
clusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
women . . . of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The crucial differ-
ence between the two definitions is subtle. The Andrews definition addresses 
the comparative nature of equality, inviting the decision-maker to assess 
whether the treatment of group members is worse than the treatment of soci-
ety members in general. The CEDAW definition, on the other hand, requires 
a messy analysis to determine whether treatment is inferior “on the basis of” 
sex. Determining whether mistreatment occurs because of a characteristic is 
a difficult task when the definition of discrimination makes no reference to 
groups. Under a group-based definition, the analysis is easier: determine 
whether other individuals that share a characteristic (i.e., members of a 
group) receive similar treatment, and then compare that treatment to other 
groups. If the treatment of entire group is consistently worse than that of 
another, discrimination is at play. 
A substantive, group-based definition of discrimination also helps guard 
against inversions of equality legislation where members of traditionally 
elite groups protest favorable treatment of members of other groups. By ad-
hering to the principle that “[t]he more vulnerable the group adversely 
affected by the discrimination, the more likely the discrimination will be 
held to be unfair,” articulated in the South African case President of the Re-
public of South Africa v. Hugo, decision-makers can avoid absurd results 
that allow elites to use anti-discrimination laws to maintain their position of 
superiority and privilege in society. Consider, for example, Justice Thomas’ 
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which a white woman who was denied 
admission to the University of Michigan Law School complained of dis-
crimination because the school considered racial background as one factor 
in the admissions process. He wrote that “[n]o one would argue that a uni-
versity could set up a lower general admission standard and then impose 
heightened requirements only on black applicants,” apparently declining to 
take into account the concerned groups’ relative vulnerability in society.  
V. Lawmakers Should Focus on “Disadvantaged Groups,”  
Not Minorities 
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to “discrete and insular minorities” as eligible for specific attention. This 
determination, however, leaves out a very large group that suffers institu-
tionalized discrimination everywhere: women. As a group, women are 
hardly discrete or insular, and they are not in the minority—yet everywhere 
they are second-class citizens.  
Therefore, the Canadian Supreme Court’s framework that disadvantaged 
groups are entitled to collective rights more aptly captures the true condi-
tions of social inequality than does the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction. 
MacKinnon calls “disadvantaged groups” an “open-ended concept” that 
“responds to changes in social reality.” This open-endedness is open to criti-
cism for giving the concept a lack of direction and thwarting the 
development of a cohesive plan. In law-making, though, it is more important 
to be practical and address the issue at hand than to always do so according 
to a pre-determined, over-arching formula.  
Conclusion 
Concentrating on group identity is not just a useful tool for decision-
makers; activists know that that there is power in numbers. The very concept 
of a group, as opposed to a collection of individuals, commands attention. 
The U.S. Civil Rights Movement and the Women’s Liberation Movement 
are examples of the effectiveness of group movements. Both altered the so-
cial and political climate surrounding equality, as well as the substance of 
equality law. The engagement and empowerment of the groups concerned 
bolsters the need to shift to a focus on groups in equality thinking.  
No matter the legal guarantees of equality a country provides, true social 
justice remains elusive. Many of the impediments on social equality arise 
from the tendency of traditional equality—derived from Aristotle’s philoso-
phy that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike—to perpetuate 
inequality by providing justification for inferior treatment of differently 
situated persons. Only if all segments of society, from those making the law 
to those affected by it, frame equality issues in group terms, can we fully 
achieve substantive equality. 
